High-performance control systems (HPCSs), including active, hybrid, and semi-active control strategies, can perform over a wide excitation bandwidth and are therefore good candidates for multi-hazard mitigation. However, the number of HPCS applications in the field is very limited. This is likely due the perceived high costs of installation, maintenance, possible malfunction, and lack of tools to financially justify their implementation. Such financial justifications could be conducted through life cycle cost (LCC) analysis, but would result in a computationally demanding task due to the very large number of simulations required given the large number of uncertainties. In this paper, two sets of methods for conducting LCC analyses are compared, and their performance is assessed as a function of LCC estimation accuracy and computational requirements. The first set is based on deterministic scenarios, and is based on the simulation of all possible scenarios, termed what-if analysis. Variations of the what-if method are investigated, where the simulations are only conducted for the most likely scenarios, termed most-likely (ML) analysis. The second set is based on stochastic scenarios, and is based on Monte-Carlo (MC) analysis. Variations of the MC method are investigated, one based on the coefficient of variation of output data, and one proposed by the authors based on the convergence of the estimated costs, termed bounded MC. A demonstration of the LCC analysis methodology is conducted, where an HPCS is used for the mitigation of seismic-induced vibrations on a five story structure. Uncertainties under consideration include sensor failure, mechanical wear, and seismic events. Results are compared against the uncontrolled structure and a passive viscous strategy, and demonstrate that 1) the LCC methodology can be used to financially justify the utilization on an HPCS; and 2) the bounded MC method leads to accurate cost estimations using a lower number of simulations.
INTRODUCTION
An effective solution to improve the performance of civil structures and enhance their resilience against natural (e.g., seismic and high wind) and human-made (e.g., blast) hazards is the integration of supplemental damping systems.
While passive damping systems are now widely accepted and applied in the structural engineering field (Ubertini 2010; Wu and Phillips 2017; Amjadian and Agrawal 2018) , they typically exhibit a limited performance bandwidth, and are therefore restricted to achieve the prescribed performance under a single type of hazard (He et al. 2003; Lu et al. 2008; Cao et al. 2016) . Recently, research on high-performance control systems (HPCSs), including active (Ubertini 2008; Materazzi and Ubertini 2011; Venanzi et al. 2012) , semi-active (Cao et al. 2015; Amjadian and Agrawal 2017; Lu et al. 2018 ) and hybrid (Love et al. 2011; Shin et al. 2013; Høgsberg and Brodersen 2014) systems, has demonstrated the great potential of these devices for vibration mitigation. Due to their adaptive nature, HPCSs have the capability to perform over a wide excitation bandwidth. Provided a properly designed control law, they could be effective at mitigating multiple simultaneous or non-simultaneous types of hazards (Kim et al. 2010; Cao and Laflamme 2017; Cao et al. 2018) . Nevertheless, the implementation of HPCSs is still in its infancy (Soong and Spencer 2002; Casciati et al. 2012 ). This can be attributed to large uncertainties in the closed-loop process, including mechanical performance, reliance on power, electrical and mechanical reliability of sensors and actuators, etc. (Casciati et al. 2012 ). To promote their implementation, it is critical to be capable of financially justifying their utilization despite additional costs associated with installation and maintenance, and uncertainties throughout the closed-loop configuration.
The performance of HPCSs has been financially quantified in some studies. Wen and Shinozuka (Wen and Shinozuka 1998) quantified the expected life-cycle cost (LCC) of a structure equipped with an active control system for seismic mitigation. Parametric studies were conducted to evaluate the expected total LCC of the structure subjected to seismic excitations. Later, Laflamme et al. (Laflamme et al. 2011c ) investigated the performance of a semi-active friction device, termed modified friction device, for wind-induced vibration reduction in a high-rise building. Results showed that the financial potential of using semi-active dampers in lieu of the existing passive strategy would result in saving in the order of 20%-30% in the cost of the damping system. Also, Ham et al. (Hahm et al. 2013 ) conducted a LCC analysis on a cable-stayed bridge equipped with magnetorheological dampers. The total costs, including construction cost, additional installation cost of the magnetorheological dampers, and expected structural damage costs from seismic events were evaluated. The analyses demonstrated that the cost-effectiveness of semi-active strategy is highly dependent on the seismic level and soil conditions. The authors Micheli et al. (Micheli et al. 2017 ) proposed a life-cycle analysis (LCA) methodology for tall buildings equipped with semi-active dampers subjected to wind excitation. Costs from strong wind-induced vibrations were related to the potential economic losses associated with motion sickness affecting the building's occupants. LCAs demonstrated the potential financial benefits of HPCS versus passive damping strategies. While this surveyed research represents existing efforts towards broader implementations of HPCSs, the impact of uncertainties within the closed-loop configuration (e.g., power, sensors, actuators, etc.), has been overlooked in the LCA process. Some studies have focused on the effect of closed-loop uncertainties in mitigation performance. For instance, Battaini and Dyke (Battaini and Dyke 1998) experimentally evaluated the sub-performance caused by sensors failure in a three story structure equipped with an active tuned mass damper. Results showed that the mitigation performance of the damping system began to deteriorate with the failure of a single sensor. The severity of performance deterioration was dependent on the location of the failed sensor. Later, Battaini et al. (Battaini et al. 2000) proposed a fault tree approach for the reliability evaluation of actively controlled structures. In this approach, possible failure patterns, fault rates, and average repair time of the HPCS components were utilized within a probabilistic analysis framework. Kim et al. ) studied the impact of sensor faults in a three story building equipped with a magnetorheological damper through seismic fragility analysis. The obtained fragility curves showed that the controlled structure provided a better seismic mitigation performance than that of the uncontrolled case under both partial and full sensor failure scenarios. Also, Cha and Agrawal (Cha and Agrawal 2014) investigated the effects of various sensor faults and noise levels on the seismic performance of a three-story frame equipped with magnetorheological dampers. Three different control algorithms were compared, and a fault detection method was introduced. The vast majority of research on uncertainty in HPCSs has focused on sensor failure. Other factors, such as component degradation (e.g., wear, leakage) and power unavailability, are yet to be integrated in the performance studies. The lack of such research is likely due to the exponentially growing number of cases with each additional uncertainty case that must be simulated in order to evaluate the performance of the system. The objective of this paper is to present a strategy enabling the financial quantification of HPCSs subjected to uncertainties in their closed-loop configurations in order to promote the acceptability of HPCSs in structural engineering. The challenge is in the development of a LCC analysis framework capable of estimating the financial performance of an HPCS while considering a large set of possible scenarios, including uncertainty and failure in the closed-loop configuration, and uncertainties associated with excitations and physical model of the strucure. As a solution, this paper investigates two methodologies integrated in an LCC analysis framework. The first one is based on deterministic scenarios, and is termed the what-if analysis. A modified version of this traditional method is introduced, termed the most-likely (ML) analysis. It consists of only simulating the failure scenarios contained within a pre-determined high probability of occurrence threshold. The other strategy is based on stochastic scenarios and builds on the Monte Carlo (MC) method. Variations of the MC method are investigated, including one based on the coefficient of variation of output data, and one introduced by the authors based on the convergence of the estimation, which is termed bounded MC. The performance of all the methods is compared and assessed as a function of the accuracy of the cost estimation and computational requirements, by simulating a five-story structure equipped with an HPCS and subjected to a seismic event. The capability of leveraging the LCC analysis framework for financially quantifying the HPCS is also investigated by comparing its performance against an uncontrolled scenario and a passive scenario where the structure is equipped with viscous dampers.
It follows that the novelty of this paper are in 1) integrating the notion of uncertainties in the closed-loop configuration of structural control systems, yielding a large set of possible permutations for numerical simulations when estimating their performance; 2) adapting and investigating known numerical simulation strategies along with some of their variations to assess computing efficiencies defined as estimation accuracy as a function of the number of required simulations; and 3) combining findings to propose and demonstrate an LCC procedure to financially quantify the performance of HPCSs in uncertain environments. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main sources of uncertainty in HPCS and describes uncertainty analysis techniques. Section 3 introduces the methodology used to investigate various analysis strategies on a synthetic 5-story building equipped with semi-active dampers. Section 4 presents and discusses the simulation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
ANALYSIS OF HPCSS UNDER UNCERTAINTIES
This Section discusses various sources of uncertainties found in a typical closed-loop configuration, and describes uncertainty analysis techniques based on deterministic and stochastic scenarios along with their variations.
Sources of Uncertainties
Generally, the closed loop configuration of an HPCS consists of three major components: 1) sensors, which provide state measurements; 2) actuated damping devices, which produce forces that are often reactive, responsible for the supplemental damping; and 3) controllers, which control the outputs of the actuators based on the state measurements.
It follows that various types of uncertainties may arise from these components, in the form of failure or wear for instance. Common uncertainty sources are described below, and are summarized in Table 1 .
Uncertainties from sensors may arise in the form of failures, caused by manufacturing inefficiencies, improper calibration, hardware design, noise, and disconnections (Cha and Agrawal 2014) , and depend on the type of sensor used. Common sources of failure in piezoelectric sensors (e.g., for acceleration feedback) are fatigue, electric shock, and degradation of materials (Balaban et al. 2009 ). These failures may generate scaling errors in the high frequency range and scaling of the output signal. Temperature variations can provoke a partial or complete loss of sensing capability. Also, foil gauges (e.g., for strain feedback) may suffer from fatigue of wires, temperature variations, and debonding, which may provoke scaling errors, bias in readings, and intermittent or complete failure, respectively.
Linear variable differential transformers (LVDT) (e.g., relative displacement feedback), may experience leaking of magnetic fields and change in the primary voltage, which can provoke bias in readings and scaling errors, respectively.
Other failures can occur at the data acquisition system level and cables, typically due to surges in the power network, humidity, and ageing of connections, which may result in the loss of signals.
On the actuated damping devices side, uncertainties are commonly related to the failure of a component that can lead to sub-performance or complete failure, the degradation of materials that can cause a reduction in the force capacity, and excessive loading that can cause complete failure. An important part of the components is the actuator, for which the sources of uncertainties depend on the actuation mechanism (e.g., electrical, pneumatic, hydraulic). The actuators, similarly to sensors and controllers, are vulnerable to power outages often provoked by equipment failure, operator errors, and strong wind/rain events (Campbell 2012) . For example, considering a variable friction damper, the device may experience cold weld and wear of the friction material, which will reduce damping performance, and excessive loading (e.g., displacement) can cause a violent impact that could provoke complete failure (Downey et al. 2016 ). If the device was actuated by a hydraulic actuator, the actuator itself could suffer from the failure of a pump, an accumulator, a piston, or a servovalve that can make the device inoperable (Battaini et al. 2000) .
The largest source of uncertainties in controllers are in the possible sub-performance associated with the mistuning of the algorithm parameters from unmodeled dynamics, nonlinearities, and uncertainties in the excitation and plant dynamics. There are also possible faults in electronic components that are generally associated with electrostatic discharge, melting of internal elements, manufacturing faults, and incorrect design or software crash (Goble 1998) .
While mistuning will cause sub-performance, the failure of electronic components will provoke an interruption of the control algorithm leading to inoperability of the HPCS.
In a mechanical damping device, the sources of failure vary based on the damping mechanism utilized. For instance, the degradation of the friction material due to fatigue or harsh environment, should be considered in friction dampers, while the leakage of the fluid may be a concern for magnetorheological dampers. In friction bearings, the friction coefficient may be affected by sliding velocity, temperature effects, load, and number of cycles (Castaldo et al. 2016 ). 
Simulation Techniques
The cost-benefit evaluation of a structure equipped with HPCSs under uncertain performance is challenging. The nonlinear dynamics from the HPCS and the effects of uncertainties prevent the derivation of a closed-loop solution to precisely determine the behavior of a given system. For example, as discussed in the introduction, the failure of a sensor would have different effects on the HPCS performance depending on the location of that sensor. It follows that one would need to conduct a large number of simulations to determine the true possible performance of a given system, which number could be very large depending on the number of uncertainties considered.
To illustrate this concept, Fig. 1 shows the total number of possible permutations N = n r that can be considered in a numerical simulation arising from a 2D structure equipped with a decentralized HPCS at each floor, and subjected to a number of uncertainty cases where each uncertainty is treated as a discrete case, where n is the discrete number of possible uncertainty cases and r is the number of uncertainty locations (e.g., floors). For example, a five story structure subjected to four uncertainty cases per floor (e.g., two sensor failure scenarios and two controller failure scenarios) yields N = 4 5 = 1, 024 permutations, assuming a binary state for each scenario (i.e., failed or not failed). A high-rise
building (e.g., 40 floors) subjected to seismic excitation and equipped with an HPCS would yield a paramount number of simulations if one considers uncertainties related to sensors, actuators, and controllers, let alone several ground motions and comparisons with other mitigation strategies to assess financial gains.
In Fig. 1 , three different computational demand ranges are arbitrarily identified: low, moderate, and high demand.
The low level corresponds to the cases associated with N ≤ 10 4 , and ranked as computationally inexpensive. The moderate level corresponds to 10 4 < N ≤ 10 9 and is considered as computationally feasible. The high level corresponds to cases with N > 10 9 , where the computational demand is considered as demanding and not practical. It can be observed that the computational demand increases substantially with an increasing number of floors or uncertainty cases.
To address this computational burden, two different sets of analysis techniques are presented. These techniques can be used to conduct numerical simulations in order to determine or estimate the financial benefits of a structure equipped with a HPCS under uncertain performance. Each method is used to compute costs of repair C F for a damaged structure, following a natural hazard for instance. The first set is based on deterministic scenarios, while the second set is based on stochastic scenarios. These methods will later be simulated and their performance assessed in terms computational efficiency, defined as the accuracy of costs estimation as a function the number of required simulations. Methods based on deterministic scenarios are considered due to higher accuracy from the simulation of all the important uncertain scenarios, while methods based on stochastic scenarios are considered because of their potential to improve computational time.
Deterministic Scenarios Methods
The what-if analysis method is a straightforward yet computationally expensive approach to perform risk assessment (Vose 2008) . This method considers all of the possible uncertain scenarios N, each with a probability of
Each of the possible scenario is taken as deterministic and simulated to obtain the damage cost, C R,i associated with the i-th event. The expected losses are given in the form of costs of failure, C F (Faber and Stewart 2003) :
In this paper, results from the what-if analyses are taken as the ground truth for benchmarking performance.
However, that analysis method is impractical for large values of N. A solution is to truncate the number of required simulations by only considering the most likely events, termed the ML analysis method. Considering only the α% most likely scenarios corresponding to N α scenarios with ∑ N α i=1 p i = α%, Eq. 1 is modified to:
where C R,off is the damage costs associated with the passively controlled system with no power (i.e., fail-safe mode), assuming that when an event with a likelihood lower than α% occurs, the HPCS automatically switches to such passive-off mode. Remark that C R,off could be replaced by the damage costs associated with other strategies, for instance the uncontrolled case if one would prefer a more conservative estimate.
A general note is that for the ML cases, continuous probability distributions need to be discretized in a user-defined number of bins, depending on the desired resolution.
Stochastic Scenarios Methods
The MC method is a traditional approach for the generation of stochastic scenarios from an underlying probability distribution. This strategy has been widely used in civil engineering to model uncertainties in mass, stiffness and damping of structures (Spencer et al. 1994 ). However, it is difficult to determine a priori the number of scenarios, N m , that is required to obtain an estimation of the output within a given accuracy bound (Byrne 2013; Mundform et al. 2011 ). With the MC approach, C F is given by:
In the MC method, a binomial distribution is used to generate scenarios from uncertainties characterized by discrete events such as the number of sensor failures and their locations. The binomial cumulative distribution function F bin is written
where q is the number of discrete events, n e the number of elements that may fail, and p the probability associated with a failure event.
Two strategies are investigated for finding N m . The first strategy (MC-1) is based on work by Byrne (Byrne 2013).
An initial set of twenty simulations are performed to estimate the coefficient of variation (COV) of the output data, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. For a γ% confidence level, the minimum number of required simulations is
where v is the selected confidence interval width taken as v = 0.05 and z (γ/2) is the critical value of the standard normal distribution corresponding to the γ% confidence level, here corresponding to z (γ/2) = 1.96 (γ = 5%).
The second strategy (MC-2) is defined by the authors. It is based on the convergence of the cumulative averagē C F,i . With this strategy, the algorithm sequentially determines after each simulation whether the numerical simulations should be continued or not, instead of relying on a prior estimation of the number of simulations that would be necessary. The average cost of failuresC F,i is computed at every i-th iteration, and the numerical simulations are interrupted when its standard deviation and average converge to a steady value within a tolerance ε over a window size w. The MC-2 algorithm is as follows.
Step 1. Generate samples of uncertain scenarios from the binomial distribution (Eq. 4).
Step 2. Set ε and w.
Step 3. Calculate the repair cost C R,i at iteration n.
Step 4. ComputeC F,n and its standard deviation σC ,n
Step 5. Compute the relative change in standard deviation D n,s = (σC ,n − σC ,n−1 )/σC ,n−1 and average D n,m = (C F,n − C F,n−1 )/C F,n−1 .
Step 6 Compute the maximum values D max,ns and D max,nm over the sliding window [ D n−w D n ] for n ≥ w, for the relative changes in standard deviation and average, respectively.
Step 7. Check if D max,ns ≤ ε and D max,nm ≤ ε. If not, go to step 3 and produce an additional iteration with n = n + 1.
Otherwise, the analysis is finished with C F =C F,n .
METHODOLOGY
A 5-story office building is selected as a numerical example for the evaluation of the uncertainty quantification strategies under earthquake excitations. The structure is equipped with a semi-active friction device previously proposed by the authors, termed Banded Rotary Friction Device (BRFD). The building and semi-active device simulation techniques are described. Next, different seismic load characteristics and control cases are discussed. After, the life cycle analysis procedure is explained, and the uncertainty cases under investigation are described.
Building
The simulated building is a steel-moment resisting structure located in Shizuoka City, Japan, widely used in literature for the simulation and validation of structural control strategies (Nishitani and Inoue 2001; Kurata and Kobori 2003; Cao et al. 2018) . A low-rise building is used in order to yield a trackable number of possible permutations for benchmark purposes. Here, the building is simulated in Berkeley, California, in order to enable the use of U.S. codes for the quantification of damages. The weak direction of building was modeled as a spring-dashpot-mass system, as shown in Fig. 2 , with the dynamic properties described in the figure. In Fig. 2 (a), x i (t) and f i (t) respectively indicate the displacement and the actuator control force at the i-th floor, and a g (t) is the ground acceleration. In Fig. 2 (b) , T i is the i-th natural period while ρ i represents the i-th effective mass. The inter-story height is equal to 4.2 m at the ground level and 3.6 m for all other floors.
The equation of motion of the 5-story building under seismic load has the form (Connor and Laflamme 2014) : where x ∈ R 5×1 ,ẋ ∈ R 5×1 , andẍ ∈ R 5×1 are the displacement, velocity and acceleration vectors, respectively, a g ∈ R 1×1 is the seismic acceleration, F ∈ R 5×1 is the control input vector, M ∈ R 5×5 , C ∈ R 5×5 , and K ∈ R 5×5 are the mass, damping, and stiffness matrices, respectively, and E g ∈ R 5×1 and E f ∈ R 5×5 are the seismic acceleration and control input location matrices, respectively.
The state-space representation of Eq.
(3) is given by:
where X = [ xẋ ] T ∈ R 10×1 is the state vector, and with
The numerical algorithm follows the discrete form of the Duhamel integral (Connor and Laflamme 2014) :
where ∆ t is the simulation time interval and I is identity matrix. The analysis assumes the building remains elastic at all time and damage is defined as a function of acceleration and inter-storey drift thresholds, as it will be discussed later. This assumption simplifies the simulations and provides a conservative bound on relative gains from mitigation strategies.
Semi-active friction device
The BRFD is based on a mechanically robust double wrap band brake and its dynamic behavior has been characterized using a 3-stage dynamic model (Downey et al. 2016 ). Fig. 3 shows the modeled dynamic behavior of a 45 kN BRFD under a harmonic excitation of 2.54 cm amplitude at 0.5 Hz under various levels of damping capacity. The 3-stage dynamic model is as follows. Stage 1 is a typical friction dynamics and the damping force f is modeled using a LuGre friction model: 
where C c and C s are constants. Stages 2 and 3 are two linear stiffness regions that represent the backlash effect in the BRFD. The damping force f is modeled as linear stiffness elements k 2 and k 3 during displacements d 2 and d 3 in stage 2 and 3, respectively. Additionally, a smooth transition region between three distinct stages is generated using a C ∞ function (Laflamme et al. 2011b) :
where z 0 is the reference displacement when transitioning to a new stage, and γ 1 and γ 2 are constants. The damping force f within the transition from stage i to stage j is written as:
The model parameter values used in the simulation are listed in Table 2 . The damping capacity of the BRFD is scaled to the design capacity f i,max by selecting corresponding input force F input such that F c = f i,max = C c F input . 
Seismic Excitations
A seismic hazard level corresponding to 10% probability of exceedance in 50 years is considered and a set of nine ground motions is selected consistent with Yang et al. (Yang et al. 2009 ). The design response spectrum for the simulated building was established using spectral acceleration parameters S DS = 1.64 g and S D1 = 1.02 g, derived from the USGS seismic design map for Berkeley, CA (USGS 2018). Each ground motion is scaled to the design response spectrum using the amplitude-scaling method (Bazzurro and Luco 2004) . Details on the nine selected earthquakes and the corresponding scale factors (SF) are listed in Table 3 . The ground motion response spectra scaled to the design spectrum are plotted in Fig. 4 . 
Control Cases
In this paper, the LCC is used to benchmark the performance of the HPCS under a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) controller against a passive viscous case. The design for the damping capacity starts with the sizing of the passive viscous system. The damping matrix, C v , representing the supplemental damping provided by the damping devices, is assumed proportional to the stiffness matrix K:
where α v is a constant determined by (Connor and Laflamme 2014) :
where ω n is the natural frequency of the building and ξ is the viscous damping ratio. A supplemental damping ratio of ξ = 2.5% was selected to guarantee a target maximum average inter-story drift of 1% in the passive viscous case under the design earthquakes, as prescribed by ASCE 41 − 06 (ASCE/SEI 2007). The viscous damping coefficient c i for the i-th passive viscous damper is given by:
and the damping capacity f i,max of the viscous device installed at the i-th floor is
whereδ i,max = max|ẋ i (t) −ẋ i−1 (t)| is maximum average inter-story velocity at the i-th floor, except at the first floor whereδ 1,max = max|ẋ 1 (t)|. Then, the BRFDs are sized to provide an equivalent damping capability to those of the viscous dampers. Here, f i,max under the passive viscous case is used for the design of BRFDs. As an example, Fig. 5 compares force-displacement loops for the BRFDs and viscous dampers under EQ4 with the BRFD under the passiveon mode (i.e., full power). The figure shows both devices exhibiting equivalent damping. The final configuration of the dampers is listed in Table 4 .
The LQR controller is used to determine the required control force F req . The LQR parameters are tuned to mini- mize the performance objective index J:
with:
where Q is the regulatory weight matrix with positive definite diagonal elements q d , q v and R = q r I 5×5 is the actuation weight matrix with a positive constant q r . In the simulation, q d = 100, q v = 300 and q r = 1 × 10 −4 .
The actual damping force, f act , is taken as a function of the voltage dynamics:
where f 0 is a voltage scaling constant, ν req is the required voltage computed from the required control force f req , ν act is the actual voltage in the actuator, and ν delay is a positive constant taken as 200 sec −1 (Cao et al. 2015) . The required voltage ν req is computed based on a bang-bang control rule, where the voltage is set to maximum if the required force f req is higher than the BRFD capacity and set to zero if the signs of f req andδ max are equal:
Life-Cycle Analysis
The LCC of the structure is taken as (Alipour et al. 2011) :
where C 0 is the initial construction cost, C I is the initial installation cost of supplemental damping devices and supporting structural components, C M is the maintenance cost, and C F is the annual repair cost computed using the strategies described in Section 2. For the specialized case of no uncertainties in the LCC, C F = C R , where C R is the damage costs incurred by the seismic excitation.
The initial installation cost of the BRFD, C I , includes the cost of the mechanical device, electronic components, and sensors. The mechanical device cost C d is taken as a function of the capacity. In particular, the cost of a viscous damper (in USD) can be estimated using (Taflanidis and Gidaris 2013):
Eq. 22 is adapted to calculate the device costs of the BRFD by applying an assumed discount factor of 30% to The maintenance cost of the BRFDs, C M , covers a regular system check and an annual hardware check for 50 years, and is assumed to be $47,500 (adapted from (Tse et al. 2012) ). For the viscous strategy, it is assumed that no maintenance is required, with C M = 0 (Taylor 2018) .
The annual repair cost following a seismic event, C R , is given by:
where τ is the cost analysis time interval (taken as 1 year), T is the lifetime of the structure (taken as 50 years), η represents the annual occurrence rate of the seismic hazard for the considered hazard level (equal to 2.12 × 10 −3 , from USGS website), β is the expected rate of return (taken as 3%), N d is the number of considered structural and nonstructural elements, C j represents the repair or replacement cost of the j-th element, P j is the probability of the j-th element being damaged.
In order to estimate P j , first damage thresholds should be established for the structural and nonstructural components in the building. Table 6 lists the damage state (D s ) thresholds for the six elements considered in the cost analysis (N d = 6), along with the corresponding engineering demand parameters (EDPs) and repair costs C j . Here, δ i,max indicates the maximum inter-story drift at the i-th floor, h the inter-story height, andẍ i,max is the maximum acceleration.
To define thresholds D s , the median values of the fragility curves reported by FEMA-P-58 (FEMA 2012) are taken as reference. Once the system EDPs are determined through numerical simulations, P j in Eq. 23 can be computed. If the j-th damage threshold is exceeded, P j = 1, otherwise P j = 0. The number or quantity of structural and nonstructural elements per floor (Q) are described in Table 6 , and they are estimated based on the information reported in Kurata et al. (Kurata et al. 1999 ), using standard office dimensions. Repair and replacement costs for each element listed in Table 6 are also taken from FEMA-P-58, given in 2011 dollar value. The expected rate of return, β , is used to account for the time value of the money. The value C j is obtained by multiplying the number or quantity of damaged structural and nonstructural elements by the corresponding repair cost. 
Uncertainty Cases
The uncertainty analysis starts with three different uncertainty cases under consideration: case 1, complete sensor failure (N = 2 5 · 9 = 288); case 2, three different states of damping device degradation (N = 3 5 · 9 = 2, 187); and case 3, the combination of sensor failure and two different states of damping device degradation (N = 4 5 · 9 = 9, 216). In case 1, the failure of the i-th sensor is modeled as a zero output signal. In case 2, the degradation of the i-th device is modeled as a decrease in the i-th maximum damping force's capacity, and three capacity levels of 100%, 75%, and 50% are considered. In case 3, the failure of the i-th sensor is modeled as a zero output signal, and the degradation states under consideration are 100% and 50%. Note that the uncertainties associated with the physical model of the structure are not considered.
These three cases are used to study the behavior of the cost analysis methodologies under a manageable number of permutations (up to a total of 9,216 simulations) to benchmark the performance to the what-if method. This study will allow the selection of a methodology to be used in demonstrating the LCC of a structure subjected to a large set of uncertainties. This is done through uncertainty cases 4 and 5. Uncertainty case 4 is similar to uncertainty case 3, but with three device degradation states (100%, 75%, and 50%), yielding N = (2 × 3) 5 · 9 = 69, 984 scenarios.
Uncertainty case 5 is uncertainty case 4, but with added controller failure, where controller failure is simulated by turning the corresponding device to a passive-on mode, yielding N = 12 5 · 9 = 2, 239, 488 simulations. In this last case, because of the large number of simulations, only the stochastic scenario methods are used in the analysis.
The failure rates of the HPCS components, λ , are taken from Ref. (Battaini et al. 2000) (given in failure per hour).
Assuming a constant failure rate, the corresponding annual probability of failure p is calculated as:
where t is set to 1 year (8760 hr). Probabilities p = 0.35 and 0.58 are obtained for the sensors and actuators, respectively. For case 5, the annual probability of failure of the controller is arbitrarily set to p = 0.20 in order to provide a conservative lower bound.
To conduct the what-if analysis, the likelihood of a single failure event p i (Eq. 1) is calculated assuming independent events and based on the p values from Eq. 24. In the ML analyses, three different values of α are considered:
99%, 90%, and 80%. Table 7 summarizes and compares the number of uncertain events analyzed under each case, and the total number of simulations performed considering the nine seismic events. For the MC-1 and MC-2 techniques, the p values in Eq. 4 for sensor and actuator failures are also taken as 0.35 and 0.58, respectively. The resulting probability functions are illustrated in Fig. 6 , where F bin is calculated using Eq. 4. Samples of sensor and actuator failures in case 3 are generated from the two binomial cumulative distribution functions and are randomly paired. The number of building floors in which the failure occurs is randomly selected, considering an equal probability of occurrence for each floor combination. In case 2, the actuator degradation states (e.g., 75% and 50% capacity reduction) are also randomly selected with an equal probability of occurrence.
The COVs from Eq. 5 are estimated as 43% for case 1, 63% for case 2, and 80% for case 3, computed based on the first 20 simulation results, as described in Section 2. The variability of the output is the highest when two uncertainties (sensor failure and actuator degradation) are considered. In the bounded MC, the window size is taken as w = 10, and two different values for the tolerance ε are investigated: ε = 1.0% and ε = 0.5%.
For the stochastic scenarios, results from MC-1 and MC-2 are benchmarked against a standard Monte Carlo simulation (MC-3), with N m = 5,000 samples analyzed. The ground motion is selected randomly between the nine records described in Sec. 3 assuming a uniform distribution. In addition, the analyses are repeated three times for each MC case, namely R1, R2, and R3, in order to study the robustness of the strategies. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section begins with the investigation of the performance of the cost analysis methods for uncertainty cases 1-3. Results from the deterministic-based methods are presented, followed by the results from the stochastic-based methods. Performance is presented in terms of C F benchmarked against that under the what-if scenario, and the required number of simulations to be performed. A methodology will be selected, and applied in the demonstration of the LCC for a structure equipped with HPCS under a larger set of uncertainties (uncertainty cases 4-5). Performance is presented in terms of C F and a discussion is added on the potential financial benefits of the given HPCS. Table 7) , with the error taken as:
Failure Cost Estimation -Deterministic Scenarios
where C F,W I is the cost obtained from the what-if analysis. Results show that for uncertainty cases 1 and 2, the ML-α = 90% and ML-α = 80% lead to relatively high errors (≥ 10%) in the C F estimation, while ML-α = 99% yields the smallest error, as expected. As the number of possible permutations grows, and thus the number of required simulations, there is a significant decrease in the error. For uncertainty case 3, all three analyses show a good agreement in the C F estimation, but at the cost of a larger number of required simulations. Results indicate that the deterministic- 
Failure Cost Estimation -Stochastic Scenarios
Results from the stochastic-based methods are presented in Fig. 8 and listed in Table 8 , for three independent simulations R1, R2, and R3. Markers in Fig. 8 indicate the number of simulations needed for the algorithm to attain convergence (N m ), using a triangle for MC-1, a circle for MC-2 ε = 1%, and a square for MC-2 ε = 0.5%. The standard MC (MC-3) results up to 5,000 simulations are shown by the continuous lines. Table 8 lists the average number of simulations, average C F , and standard deviation σ C,N m over R1, R2 and R3, and the percentage error with respect to results from the what-if analysis cost. Results show that both MC-1 and MC-2 lead to a gain in terms of error versus number of simulations performed in comparison with a standard MC procedure with an arbitrarily selected N m = 5, 000 (MC-3). In particular, MC-2 ε = 1.0% leads to a significantly lower N m for all the cases. However, the average error associated with MC-2ε = 1.0% is substantially higher for cases 1 and 2, with a maximum of 10% in case 1. MC-1 and MC-2ε = 0.5% perform similarly in both the number of simulations and error, but with an improved error and standard deviation for MC-2 under cases 2 and 3. Comparing both sets of results under MC-2, lowering the tolerance to ε = 0.5% provides a significant gain in performance, but analogous to the ML methods, this gain reduces with the increased number of possible permutations N m .
Nevertheless, a visual inspection of results in Fig. 8 shows that not all independent simulations R1 to R3 yield a similar performance, and that outliers may exist, but that the error stabilizes roughly after 1,000 iterations, except for case 3-R3. A solution could be to conduct a repeat of MC simulations to identify and remove outliers, such as R3 for uncertainty case 3, with the procedure reported in Ref. (NIST 2018) , that briefly consists of estimating the median, the lower (Q 1 ) and upper (Q 2 ) quartiles, the quartiles difference (Q 3 = Q 2 -Q 1 ) and excluding the data outside the range: [Q 2 + 1.5× Q 3 ; Q 1 -1.5× Q 3 ]. For example, if R3 under uncertainty case 3 was to be identified as an outlier, MC-2ε = 1% would require a total of 39 · 3 = 117 simulations and yield an average error of 0.80%, compared with an error of 0.60% for MC-1 requiring 921 under the same methodology. It can also be noted that while MC-3 requires a significantly larger number of simulations for an overall marginal gain in the error, it yielded a much improved standard deviation.
The convergence of results for MC-2ε = 0.5% is investigated in Fig. 9 under simulation set R1 for uncertainty cases 1 to 3. Fig. 9 (a) plots the standard deviation σC ,n versus the number of iterations, while Fig. 9 (b The robustness of the MC-2 methods with respect to the data window size w can be assessed by investigating the sensitivity of C F under various values of w. Analyses above are conducted for w = {5, 20, 50, 100} under cases 1-3, ε = 0.5%, and ε = 1.0%. Results, reported in Fig. 10 , show that the sensitivity of C F is not significant for ε = 0.5%, and can reach around 11% for ε = 1.0% due to the higher variations in data from an earlier stop criteria. 
Life Cycle Cost Analysis Results
In this subsection, the LCA methodology is demonstrated by assessing the financial potential of an HPCS installed in the simulated 5-story building and considering various sources of uncertainties. This is done on uncertainty cases 4 and 5, which contain a large number of possible permutations (N = 69, 984 and N = 2, 239, 488, respectively The financial performance of the HPCS is compared against the uncontrolled case (i.e., structure without HPCS), and against a hypothetically robust viscous damping system. The comparison in performance will be relative, and therefore the initial construction cost is neglected. Note that both the uncontrolled and passive viscous cases do not include uncertainties in the analysis, whereas C F = C R (Eq. 23).
The average maximum structural response profiles over the nine selected ground motions are illustrated in Fig.   11 in terms of maximum inter-story drift and peak acceleration profiles of the building under various control cases assuming no uncertainty. The passive viscous and HPCS strategies reduce the average maximum inter-story drift under the desired design target. The decision in using these control strategies depends on whether there exists a financial gain. to include the identification and removal of outliers. Ten independent repetitions are performed, and the median, the upper, and the lower quartiles of the C F 's are estimated and the outliers removed. Note that the single MC-2ε = 1.0% yields 38 simulations on average for this particular case. Results in Table 10 show that both MC-1 and MC-2ε = 0.5% lead to a similar number of simulations performed. However, the MC-2ε = 0.5% yields a smaller error than MC-1. The modified MC-2ε = 1.0% yields an error of 0.98%, but using only 381 simulations. MC-3, with an arbitrary N m = 5, 000, results in an error of 3.30%. The financial gains from the HPCS are still substantial with respect to both the uncontrolled and passive viscous cases, yet decreased due to the additional uncertainties, from 73.0% to 66.0% in the uncontrolled case and from 48.0% to 33.7% in the viscous case. The LCC results under case 5 are reported in Table 11 . Under this scenario, all the stochastic-based methods lead to similar LCC values and associated standard deviations. MC-2ε = 1.0% yields to the most convenient solution in terms of number of simulations, resulting in an LCC similar to the other methods, but with the lowest number of iterations. Note that the LCC of case 5 is similar to that of case 4, despite the added controller failure. This could be attributed to the use of the passive-on mechanism, which is able to provide a good vibration mitigation, as shown in Fig.   11 . From these results, it can be concluded that as the number of possible permutations grows, the stochastic-based scenarios converge to similar results, with the MC-2ε = 1.0% showing a particular promise. Generally, results show the importance of considering uncertainties in the analysis. The LCC of the structure is equal to USD 0.79 million considering no uncertainties in the HPCS configuration. When three uncertainty sources are considered (case 5), the LCC increases to USD 0.97 million, corresponding to an increase of a non negligible 21.5%. The LCC of the building can be used as a metric for decision making. For example, the LCC of different HPCS strategies can be compared in terms of financial gains and robustness of the controller, and the control strategy leading to the lowest LCC could be selected for actual application. The LCC could also be used for the design of the closed loop control configuration itself, by identifying weakness and opportunities. For instance, results from case 5 depicted the advantage of a passive-on capabilities, upon an identified failure for instance, to reduce financial risks.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a strategy to financially quantify the uncertain performance of high-performance control systems (HPCSs) was presented. The uncertainty sources arise from the possible failures of HPCS components, such as sensors, mechanical devices, and controller, during the lifespan of the structure. Two sets of methodologies implemented in a life-cycle cost (LCC) framework were investigated. The first one was based on deterministic scenarios, and was termed the what-if analysis. A modified version of this traditional method was introduced, termed the most-likely (ML) analysis. It consisted of only simulating the failure scenarios contained within a pre-determined high probability of occurrence threshold. The other strategy was based on stochastic scenarios and used the Monte Carlo (MC) method.
Variations of the MC method were investigated, including one based on the coefficient of variation of output data, and one introduced by the authors based on the convergence of the estimation termed bounded MC. The LCC framework was presented and later used as a metric to financially quantify the performance of HPCS under various uncertainties.
A 5-story office building was simulated to study the performance of the LCC methodologies under investigation.
The building was numerically equipped with a semi-active variable friction device termed the Banded Rotary Friction Device (BRFD). First, three failure cases were investigated, which yielded up to 10,000 of possible simulation permutations. Results showed that the what-if strategy provided a better alternative for low numbers of possible permutations (studied up to 2,187), and that MC was more appropriate for higher numbers of possible permutations, with MC strategies built with a stop-criterion (MC-1, MC-2ε = 1.0%, and MC-2ε = 0.5%) yielding good estimates under low numbers of simulations. Analysis method MC-2ε = 1.0%, whose convergence tolerance is less restrained, yields higher estimation errors, yet with significantly fewer simulations.
Second, the LCC methodology was demonstrated through the quantification of financial gains of the HPCS under high numbers of possible permutations by studying cases 4 and 5 that had close to 70,000 and over 2.2 million possible scenarios, respectively. Results showed that, under case 4, all MC methods converged to similar results, except for MC-2ε = 1.0% that provided the lowest estimation error once the outliers were removed with significantly fewer simulations. A similar trend in performance was observed in case 5, that had a larger number of possible permutations, concluding that MC-2ε = 1.0% appears to be a viable analysis method when the required number of simulations is very large. Remark that, while there was an effort in selecting a representative set of uncertainties along with realistic probabilities of failure, this demonstration should be used solely as an example of application of the LCC strategy instead of as a strong case supporting the use of semi-active systems, because key uncertainties may have been overlooked and the building example is synthetic along with its location.
Overall, this paper demonstrated, through the numerical example, the importance of considering uncertainties in analyzing the performance of HPCSs. The objective was to provide a discussion on computational tools that could be effectively used in numerically computing and evaluating the performance of such system, enabling the holistic integration of HPCSs within the structural design process.
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